Utilizing interviews with former Irish Republican Army (IRA) members, Loyalists, and community workers, the article looks at how militants in Northern Ireland have helped to prevent terrorism and political violence (TPV) by adopting roles in the community. By using mobile phones, a network of former combatants emerged around interface areas in the late 1990s to contain trigger causes of terrorism, providing a unique role that the state could not. The structure of the network encouraged militant groups to follow the IRA's example to disengage—thus creating a domino effect—and the co-operation between senior militants has limited the opportunities for other groups to mobilize a campaign of terrorism
The article engages with emerging debates on the potential role returning Islamic State fighters may...
Northern Ireland has endured a history of violence since its inception in 1922. The last forty years...
This paper presents an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) brigade level beha...
By characterizing the relationship between political fronts and their terrorist organizations this a...
This article investigates the impact of British informers and agents on Provisional Irish Republican...
Experiences from the end of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s campaign of armed violence have ...
Since the advent of the Good Friday peace agreement, violence associated with dissident Irish Republ...
This article explores the processes involved in leaving social movements or disengaging from terrori...
This article explores the disengagement and deradicalization experiences of Northern Irish loyalist ...
This article explores the disengagement and deradicalization experiences of Northern Irish loyalist ...
The thesis explains how terrorism campaigns end, using social movement theory to analyse the Provisi...
In this article three pathways into armed activism are identified among those who joined the Provisi...
In this article three pathways into armed activism are identified among those who joined the Provisi...
Following the 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland, levels of paramilitary violence have decli...
This study examines the internal process that led combatant groups in Northern Ireland, focusing on ...
The article engages with emerging debates on the potential role returning Islamic State fighters may...
Northern Ireland has endured a history of violence since its inception in 1922. The last forty years...
This paper presents an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) brigade level beha...
By characterizing the relationship between political fronts and their terrorist organizations this a...
This article investigates the impact of British informers and agents on Provisional Irish Republican...
Experiences from the end of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s campaign of armed violence have ...
Since the advent of the Good Friday peace agreement, violence associated with dissident Irish Republ...
This article explores the processes involved in leaving social movements or disengaging from terrori...
This article explores the disengagement and deradicalization experiences of Northern Irish loyalist ...
This article explores the disengagement and deradicalization experiences of Northern Irish loyalist ...
The thesis explains how terrorism campaigns end, using social movement theory to analyse the Provisi...
In this article three pathways into armed activism are identified among those who joined the Provisi...
In this article three pathways into armed activism are identified among those who joined the Provisi...
Following the 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland, levels of paramilitary violence have decli...
This study examines the internal process that led combatant groups in Northern Ireland, focusing on ...
The article engages with emerging debates on the potential role returning Islamic State fighters may...
Northern Ireland has endured a history of violence since its inception in 1922. The last forty years...
This paper presents an analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) brigade level beha...